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A new approach to inhabitation problems in simply typed lambda-calculus is shown, dealing
with both decision and counting problems. This approach works by exploiting a
representation of the search space generated by a given inhabitation problem, which is in
terms of a lambda-calculus for proof search that the authors developed recently. The 
representation may be seen as extending the Curry–Howard representation of proofs by
lambda terms. Our methodology reveals inductive descriptions of the decision problems,
driven by the syntax of the proof-search expressions, and produces simple, recursive decision 
procedures and counting functions. These allow to predict the number of inhabitants by
testing the given type for syntactic criteria. This new approach is comprehensive and robust: 
based on the same syntactic representation, we also derive the state-of-the-art coherence 
theorems ensuring uniqueness of inhabitants.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we study inhabitation problems in the simply typed λ-calculus, by which 
we mean both decision problems, like ‘does type A have an inhabitant?,’ and related 
questions like counting the inhabitants of a type or predicting ﬁniteness or their number 
under syntactic criteria (Hindley 1997). We propose a new approach based on a λ-calculus 
for proof search that the authors developed recently (Espı´rito Santo et al. 2013, 2016). 
This is a λ-calculus with ﬁxed points and formal sums, here named λgfp, able to represent
as a single term the entire space generated by the search for inhabitants for a given type.
Our previous work showed the correctness of this representation: the representation
FA of the search space for a given type A has a meaning [[FA]] that matches the actual
search space SA. Now this SA is another λ-term, also representing the search space for A,
but pertaining to another calculus λcoΣ , which is our semantic domain. The calculus λ
co
Σ is
the coinductive simply typed λ-calculus, extended with formal sums. We regard λcoΣ as a
canonical system, obtained by extending the Curry–Howard paradigm of representation:
in the same way as a term of the simply typed λ-calculus represents a proof, a term of
λcoΣ is a possibly inﬁnite object representing all runs of the search process. From λ
co
Σ , we
derived in our previous work the calculus λgfpΣ , which is a ﬁnitary, eﬀective counterpart
with an inductive syntax. The existence of the representation FA entails the regularity of
the search space generated by a type A. In this paper, we show that we can also base on
FA a comprehensive study of proof search and type inhabitation.
We consider two decision problems: the problem exempliﬁed above, studied by several
authors, described with more references in books on λ-calculus (Barendregt et al. 2013;
Hindley 1997), and also the problem ‘does type A have ﬁnitely many inhabitants?,’ studied
in particular in Ben-Yelles (1979) and Takahashi et al. (1996). In each case, we are able
to pin down a predicate on λgfpΣ that characterizes existence – or existence of a ﬁnite
number – of inhabitants. The correctness of the predicates is always established relative
to the semantic domain λcoΣ , which is our veriﬁcation tool. In addition, such predicates
are syntax-directed. So the decision procedure is the composition of the map A 7→ FA with
the predicate. This not only re-establishes decidability, but sheds an entirely new light
on the result: our proof is neither a combinatorial argument nor a reduction to another
problem, but rather a structural analysis.
We also consider the problem of counting inhabitants, addressed ﬁrst in Ben-Yelles
(1979). Again, one can deﬁne a syntax-directed (recursive) function on the set of λgfpΣ -
terms that is proved to return the number of inhabitants of A, when the argument is FA
and the predicate characterizing existence of a ﬁnite number of inhabitants holds of FA.
The proof is by establishing that such a counting function returns #(SA), where SA is the
‘real’ search space and # is a function deﬁned on λcoΣ -terms that counts inhabitants.
Next, we revisit the question of unique inhabitation, and theorems that predict at most
one inhabitant if the type fulﬁls a certain syntactic criterion, studied in works like Mints
(1979), Aoto and Ono (1994), Broda and Damas (2005) and Bourreau and Salvati (2011).
Still for simple types with implication as the only connective, we prove the most general
form of the so-called coherence theorem, and the counting function is a crucial tool for
that. Again, our proof gives a structural analysis: the syntactic criterion the type A fulﬁls
guarantees a certain property of FA; and we see, by applying the counting function, that
such a property of FA entails uniqueness of inhabitants.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a somewhat lengthy review of previous
material of ours (Espı´rito Santo et al. 2013, 2016), providing a reasonably self-contained
introduction to our methodology. Section 3 studies the decision problems, while Section 4
is devoted to counting and the coherence theorem. Section 5 concludes.
2. Background
This section has three subsections. First, we ﬁx our presentation of the simply typed
λ-calculus, next we recall our two representations of proof search, developed before in
Espı´rito Santo et al. (2013, 2016), and recast here as search for inhabitants of a given
type.
2.1. Simply typed λ-calculus, reduced to normal forms
It is well-known that η-long β-normal terms are complete for simply typed λ-calculus
in the sense that any typable term normalizes to a β-normal form, which in turn can
be expanded to an η-long β-normal form (see, e. g., 2D5 and 8A8 of the book Hindley
Γ, x : A ⊢ t : B
Γ ⊢ λxA.t : A ⊃ B
RIntro
(x : ~B ⊃ p) ∈ Γ ∀i, Γ ⊢ ti : Bi
Γ ⊢ x〈ti〉i : p
LVecIntro
Fig. 1. Typing rules of λ.
(1997)). We lay out a presentation of the η-long β-normal fragment of simply typed
λ-calculus, a system we often refer to by λ.
Simple types (or simply, types) are given by the grammar:
(types) A,B, C := p | A ⊃ B,
where p, q, r range over atoms. We thus do not distinguish types from propositional
implicational formulas. We will write A1 ⊃ A2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Ak ⊃ p, with k > 0, in vectorial
notation as ~A ⊃ p. For example, if the vector ~A is empty, the notation means simply p.
Normal (i.e., β-normal) λ-terms are given by
(terms) t, u ::= λxA.t | x 〈t1, . . . , tk〉,
where a countably inﬁnite set of variables, ranged over by letters x, y, w, z, is assumed. Note
that in λ-abstractions we adopt a domain-full presentation (a. k. a. Church-style syntax),
annotating the bound variable with a type. As is common-place with lambda-calculi, we
will throughout identify terms up to α-equivalence. The term constructor x 〈t1, . . . , tk〉 is
called application (traditionally, this would be expressed as a multiple application xt1 . . . tk
of λ-calculus). When k = 0, we often simply write the variable x.
We view contexts Γ as ﬁnite sets of declarations x : A, where no variable x occurs twice.
The letters Γ, ∆, Θ are used to range over contexts, and the notation dom(Γ) stands for
the set of variables declared in Γ. The context Γ, x : A is obtained from Γ by adding the
declaration x : A, and is only written if x is not declared in Γ. Context union is written
as concatenation Γ,∆ for contexts Γ and ∆ if dom(Γ) ∩ dom(∆) = Ø. We will write Γ(x)
for the type associated with x for x ∈ dom(Γ), hence viewing Γ as a function on dom(Γ).
Context inclusion Γ ⊆ ∆ is just set inclusion.
The typing rules are in Figure 1 and derive sequent Γ ⊢ t : A. LVecIntro presupposes
that the indices for the ti range over 1, . . . , k and that ~B = B1, . . . , Bk , for some k > 0. Such
obvious constraints for ﬁnite vectors will not be spelt out in the rest of the paper. In the
particular case of k = 0, in which (x : p) ∈ Γ is the only hypothesis of LVecIntro, we
type variables (with atoms). Note that the conclusion of the LVecIntro rule is an atomic
sequent, in other words, a typable term will always correspond to a λ-term in η-long form.
This restriction to atoms is typically adopted in systems tailored for proof search, as for
example systems of focused proofs. In fact, our presentation of λ corresponds to a focused
backward chaining system where all atoms are asynchronous (Liang and Miller 2009).
Example 1. The running simple examples of this paper are with the following types:
— INFTY := (p ⊃ p) ⊃ p, which is obviously uninhabited in λ-calculus (as is the type p
alone)
— CHURCH := (p ⊃ p) ⊃ p ⊃ p, the type of Church numerals λfp⊃p.λxp.fn〈x〉, n > 0.
More complicated examples are found in our previous work (Espı´rito Santo et al. 2013,
2016).
2.2. Search for inhabitants, coinductively
We are concerned with a speciﬁc kind of search problems: given Γ and A, to ﬁnd t
such that Γ ⊢ t : A, that is, to ﬁnd an inhabitant of type A in context Γ. Under the
Curry–Howard correspondence, a pair (Γ, A) may be seen as a logical sequent Γ ⇒ A,
and searching for an inhabitant of A in context Γ is the same as searching for a proof of
that sequent.
Following Espı´rito Santo et al. (2013, 2016), we model this search process through the
coinductive λ-calculus, denoted λco. The terms of λco, also called coterms, are given by
M,N ::=co λx
A.N | x〈N1, . . . , Nk〉 .
This is exactly the previous grammar for λ-terms, but read coinductively, as indicated by
the index co (still with ﬁnite tuples 〈Ni〉i). The natural notion of equality between coterms
is bisimilarity modulo α-equivalence, which we still write as plain equality. The coterms
can be seen as total Bo¨hm-like trees. However, a coterm need not arise as Bo¨hm tree of
a λ-term. We therefore use the more neutral name ‘coterm’ that reminds of being element
of a coinductive data structure. This concept has no relation to the dual of terms in the
Curry–Howard interpretation of sequent calculus.
In λco, also the typing rules of Figure 1 have to be interpreted coinductively – but the
types stay inductive and the contexts ﬁnite. Following common practice in the presentation
of coinductive syntax, we will symbolize the coinductive reading of an inference (rule)
by the double horizontal line, but we refrain from displaying Figure 1 again with double
lines – a ﬁgure where the two inference rules would be called RIntroco and LVecIntroco.
Such a system deﬁnes when Γ ⊢ N : A holds for a finite context Γ, a coterm N and a
type A.
Suppose Γ ⊢ N : A holds. Then this sequent has a derivation which is a (possibly
inﬁnite) tree of sequents, generated by applying the inference rules bottom-up; and N is
a (possibly inﬁnite) coterm, which we call a solution of σ, with σ = (Γ ⇒ A). Therefore,
such derivations are the structures generated by the search process which does not fail,
even if it runs forever, and so they subsume proofs; likewise solutions subsume typable
terms, so we may refer to the latter as finite solutions. The next step is to extend even
further the paradigm, representing also the choice points of the search process. To this
end, we extend λco to λcoΣ , whose syntax is this
(terms) M,N ::=co λx
A.N |E1 + · · ·+ En
(elimination alternatives) E ::=co x〈N1, . . . , Nk〉
where both n, k > 0 are arbitrary (thus including the empty sum of elimination alternat-
ives). T ranges over both terms and elimination alternatives. Note that summands cannot
be λ-abstractions. We will often use
∑
i Ei instead of E1 + · · ·+ En – in generic situations
or if the dependency of Ei on i is clear, as well as the number of elements.
The most natural notion of equality of terms in λcoΣ is again bisimilarity modulo α-
equivalence, but the notation
∑
i Ei already hints that we consider + to be associative.
mem(M,N)
mem(λxA.M, λxA.N)
mem(M,Ej)
mem(M,
∑
i Ei)
∀i, mem(Mi, Ni)
mem(x〈Mi〉i, x〈Ni〉i)
Fig. 2. Membership relations.
∀i, Γ ⊢ Ei : p
Γ ⊢
∑
i Ei : p
Alts
Fig. 3. Extra typing rule of λcoΣ w. r. t. λ
co.
We even want to neglect the precise order of the summands and their (ﬁnite) multiplicity.
We thus consider the sums of elimination alternatives as if they were sets of alternatives,
i. e., we further assume that + is symmetric and idempotent. As for λco, we just use
mathematical equality for this notion of bisimilarity on expressions of λcoΣ , and so the
sums of elimination alternatives can plainly be treated as if they were ﬁnite sets of
elimination alternatives (given by ﬁnitely many elimination alternatives of which several
might be identiﬁed through bisimilarity). See Section 4.2 for a more restricted reading in
order to make counting possible.
We call forests the expressions of λcoΣ – and a coterm M is a member of a forest N
when the relation mem(M,N), deﬁned coinductively in Figure 2 holds. (In Espı´rito Santo
et al. (2013), we called the forests ‘Bo¨hm forests’ to hint to their coinductive nature.)
In the typing system for λcoΣ , one derives sequents Γ ⊢ N : A and Γ ⊢ E : p. The
coinductive typing rules are the ones of λco, together with the rule given in Figure 3 (the
empty sum of elimination alternatives receives any atom as type).
A typing derivation of λcoΣ is a possibly inﬁnite tree of sequents, generated by the
bottom-up application of the inference rules, with ‘multiplicative’ branching (logically:
‘and’ branching) caused by the list of arguments in elimination alternatives, and ‘additive’
branching (logically: ‘or’ branching) caused by sums – the latter being able to express
the alternatives found in the search process when an atom p can be proved by picking
diﬀerent head variables with their appropriate arguments. So, it is no surprise that, with
this infrastructure, we can express, as a (single) forest, the entire solution space generated
by the search process when applied to given Γ and A. That forest can be deﬁned as a
function S of Γ⇒ A deﬁned by corecursion as follows:
Definition 2 (Solution spaces).
S(Γ⇒ ~A ⊃ p) := λ~x : ~A.
∑
(y:~B⊃p)∈∆
y〈S(∆⇒ Bj)〉j with ∆ := Γ,~x : ~A
Notice that, in the recursive calls to S, the contexts are (weakly) monotonically increasing
on each branch. While we are here only concerned with propositional logic, this is
reminiscent of the dynamic nature of the set of facts one has in higher order logic
programming (Miller and Nadathur 2012).
The following properties witness the robustness of the deﬁnition (Espı´rito Santo et al.
2013, 2016).
Proposition 1 (Properties of solution spaces). The following properties hold:
1. Given Γ and A, the typing Γ ⊢ S(Γ⇒ A) : A holds in λcoΣ .
2. For N ∈ λco, mem(N,S(Γ⇒ A)) iﬀ Γ ⊢ N : A in λco.
3. For t ∈ λ, mem(t,S(Γ⇒ A)) iﬀ Γ ⊢ t : A in λ.
In particular, the last two properties say that solutions subsume ﬁnite solutions conser-
vatively, i. e., given a λ-term t, Γ ⊢ t : A in λ iﬀ Γ ⊢ t : A in λco.
Example 3. The following forests are obtained by unfolding the deﬁnition for the two
running examples:
— Consider it∞ := λfp⊃p.N with N = f〈N〉 (this term N exists as an inﬁnitely repeated
application of f). Using ν as means to communicate solutions of ﬁxed-point equations
on the meta-level, we may write it∞ := λfp⊃p.νN.f〈N〉. Then, S(⇒ INFTY) = it∞ –
both sides under the initial lambda-abstraction solve the same equation.
— S(⇒ CHURCH) = λfp⊃p.λxp.S(f : p ⊃ p, x : p ⇒ p) with S(f : p ⊃ p, x : p ⇒ p) the
solution for N of the equation N = f〈N〉 + x. In other words, S(⇒ CHURCH) is the
forest λfp⊃p.λxp.νN.f〈N〉+ x.
2.3. Search for inhabitants, inductively
Finitary algorithms cannot in general process forests as input, so the next step is to ﬁnd
an alternative, equivalent, eﬀective representation that works at least for solution spaces.
To this end, an extension λgfpΣ of λ is introduced, whose syntax is given by the following
grammar (read inductively):
(terms) N ::= λxA.N | gfp Xσ .E1 + · · ·+ En | Xσ
(elimination alternatives) E ::= x〈N1, . . . , Nk〉
where X is assumed to range over a countably inﬁnite set of fixpoint variables (also
letters Y , Z will range over them), and where, as for λcoΣ , both n, k > 0 are arbitrary.
We extend our practice established for λcoΣ of writing the sums E1 + · · ·+ En in the form∑
i Ei for n > 0. As for λ
co
Σ , we will identify expressions modulo associativity, symmetry
and idempotence of +, thus treating sums of elimination alternatives as if they were the
set of those elimination alternatives. Again, we will write T for any expression of λgfpΣ ,
comprising N and E.
In the term formation rules, σ in Xσ is required to be atomic, i. e., of the form Γ ⇒ p.
Let FPV(T ) denote the set of free occurrences of typed ﬁxed-point variables in T , i. e.,
FPV(Xσ) = {Xσ}
FPV(λxA.N) = FPV(N)
FPV(x〈N1, . . . , Nk〉) =
⋃
i FPV(Ni)
FPV(gfp Xσ .E1 + · · ·+ En) = (
⋃
i FPV(Ei)) \ {X
σ′ | σ′ atomic sequent}
Perhaps unexpectedly, in gfp Xσ .
∑
i Ei, the ﬁxed-point construction gfp binds all free
occurrences of Xσ
′
in the elimination alternatives Ei, not just X
σ . But we only want this
to happen when σ 6 σ′ – which means: the context of σ′ has more declarations than that
of σ, but not with new types. Formally:
[[Xσ
′
]]ξ = [σ
′/σ]ξ(Xσ) for the unique σ 6 σ′ with Xσ ∈ dom(ξ)
[[gfp Xσ .
∑
i
Ei]]ξ = νN.
∑
i
[[Ei]]ξ∪[Xσ 7→N]
[[λxA.N]]ξ = λx
A.[[N]]ξ
[[x〈Ni〉i]]ξ = x〈[[Ni]]ξ〉i
Fig. 4. Interpretation of ﬁnitary forests.
Definition 4 (Inessential extension of contexts and sequents).
1. Γ 6 Γ′ iﬀ Γ ⊆ Γ′ and |Γ| = |Γ′|, with the set |∆| := {A | ∃x, (x : A) ∈ ∆} of assumed
types of ∆, for an arbitrary context ∆.
2. σ 6 σ′ iﬀ for some Γ 6 Γ′ and for some atom p, σ = (Γ⇒ p) and σ′ = (Γ′ ⇒ p).
In the sequel, when we refer to finitary forests, we have in mind the expressions of λgfpΣ .
The ﬁxed-point operator is called gfp (greatest ﬁxed point) to indicate that its semantics
is deﬁned in terms of the infinitary syntax λcoΣ , but there, ﬁxed points are unique. Hence,
the reader may just read this as ‘the ﬁxed point.’
Although we will use a simpliﬁed semantics for the results in the later sections, we now
recall the interpretation of expressions of λgfpΣ in terms of the coinductive syntax of λ
co
Σ
(Espı´rito Santo et al. 2016), using the ν operation on the meta-level to designate unique
ﬁxed points. It is done with the help of environments ξ, which are partial functions from
typed ﬁxed-point variables Xσ to (co)terms of λcoΣ , with domain dom(ξ) a ﬁnite set of
typed ﬁxpoint variables without duplicates, which means: Xσ1 , Xσ2 ∈ dom(ξ)⇒ σ1 = σ2.
Some technicalities are needed before giving the interpretation. We say an environment
ξ is admissible for an expression T of λgfpΣ if, for every X
σ′ ∈ FPV(T ), there is an
Xσ ∈ dom(ξ) such that σ 6 σ′. It is easy to see that T admits an environment iﬀ it is
regular in the following sense: if X occurs free in T , there is a sequent σ that is the
minimum of all σ′ such that Xσ
′
∈ FPV(T ).
The interpretation is only given for well-bound expressions, where T ∈ λgfpΣ is well-
bound if, for any of its subterms gfp Xσ .
∑
i Ei and any (free) occurrence of X
σ′ in the
Ei’s, σ 6 σ
′.
Definition 5 (Interpretation of finitary forests as forests). For a well-bound expression T
of λgfpΣ , the interpretation [[T ]]ξ for an environment ξ that is admissible for T is given
by structural recursion on T in Figure 4, where the notation [ / ] does not stand for
ordinary substitution, but rather refers to the decontraction operation explained next.†
The clause for ﬁxpoint variables in this deﬁnition has to cope with σ 6 σ′. This is done
by adjusting the value N = ξ(Xσ) looked up in the environment with the following
decontraction operation on forests which adds elimination alternatives to the sums in N,
in order to match the new declarations in σ′. If σ = (Γ ⇒ p) and σ′ = (Γ′ ⇒ p), then
[σ′/σ]N is deﬁned to be [Γ′/Γ]N, with the latter given as follows:
† In Espı´rito Santo et al. (2013, 2016), the decontraction operation was named co-contraction. The new name
reﬂects better the inverse nature of this operation w. r. t. contraction, and avoids possible associations to a
dual concept or any relation with coinductive structures.
Definition 6 (Decontraction). Let Γ 6 Γ′. For T an expression of λcoΣ , we deﬁne the
expression [Γ′/Γ]T of λcoΣ by corecursion as follows:
[Γ′/Γ](λxA.N) = λxA.[Γ′/Γ]N
[Γ′/Γ]
∑
i
Ei =
∑
i
[Γ′/Γ]Ei
[Γ′/Γ]
(
z〈Ni〉i
)
= z〈[Γ′/Γ]Ni〉i if z /∈ dom(Γ)
[Γ′/Γ]
(
z〈Ni〉i
)
=
∑
(w:A)∈∆z
w〈[Γ′/Γ]Ni〉i if z ∈ dom(Γ)
where, in the last clause, A := Γ(z) and ∆z := {(z : A)} ∪ (Γ′ \ Γ).‡
Decontraction precisely captures the extension of the solution space when going from σ
to some σ′ with σ 6 σ′:
Lemma 7 (Solution spaces and decontraction). Let σ 6 σ′. Then, S(σ′) = [σ′/σ]S(σ).
If T is closed, i. e., FPV(T ) = Ø, then the empty function is an admissible environment for
T . For a well-bound expression T that is also closed, we write [[T ]] for the interpretation
of T w. r. t. the empty function, and this is a forest.
With the ﬁnitary forests and their semantics in place, we can provide an alternative
representation F(σ) of the search space generated by a sequent σ.
Definition 8 (Finitary solution space). Let Ξ :=
−−−−−−−→
X : Θ⇒ q be a vector of m > 0
declarations (Xi : Θi ⇒ qi) where no ﬁxpoint variable name and no sequent occurs
twice. The speciﬁcation of F(σ; Ξ) is as follows, with σ = (Γ⇒ ~A ⊃ p):
If, for some 1 6 i 6 m, p = qi and Θi ⊆ Γ and |Θi| = |Γ| ∪ {A1, . . . , An}, then
F(σ; Ξ) = λzA11 · · · z
An
n .X
σ′
i ,
where i is taken to be the biggest such index. Otherwise,
F(σ; Ξ) = λzA11 · · · z
An
n .gfp Y
σ′ .
∑
(y:~B⊃p)∈∆
y〈F(∆⇒ Bj; Ξ, Y : σ
′)〉j ,
where in both cases, ∆ := Γ, z1 : A1, . . . , zn : An and σ
′ := ∆⇒ p.
Notice that, in the ﬁrst case, Xi occurs with sequent σ
′ in the resulting ﬁnitary forest
instead of with Θi ⇒ p in Ξ, but Θi 6 ∆, hence (Θi ⇒ p) 6 σ′ makes it plausible that this
process generates well-bound terms.
F(σ) denotes F(σ; Ξ) with empty Ξ. It can be proved that (i) F(σ) is well-deﬁned (the
above recursive deﬁnition terminates); (ii) F(σ) is a closed well-bound term.
Example 9. The ﬁnitary representations (i.e., by way of ﬁnitary forests) for our running
examples are
‡ Note some abuse of notation in this deﬁnition: while decontraction associates terms with terms, it associates
with elimination alternatives either a sum of elimination alternatives or a single one (in the case of the
third clause). Hence, in the second clause, some ﬂattening is required before forming the sum, but this is
left implicit. However, recall that sums are treated as if they were sets of elimination alternatives, so this
ﬂattening operation need not be detailed.
So the meta-level ﬁxpoints of the coinductive representations turn into formal ﬁxpoints
of the ﬁnitary calculus. This is not surprising. Theorem 10 ensures that we always get
expressions with formal ﬁxpoints. If no decontraction phenomena appear, the solution
spaces can then already be presented with meta-level ﬁxpoints as in these simple examples,
but this already presupposes a form of cycle analysis.
The semantics into λcoΣ of the ﬁnitary representation coincides with S(σ) (Espı´rito Santo
et al. 2013, 2016).
Theorem 10 (Equivalence). For any sequent σ, [[F(σ)]] = S(σ).
This theorem can be read as saying that the solution spaces S(σ) are regular, in that
they are the semantics of ﬁnitary forests. This is a weak form of regularity in view of
the decontraction operation that is applied in the semantics. The theorem particularly
depends on the well-deﬁnedness of F(σ), proved by a not so obvious argument given in
full in our previous work (Espı´rito Santo et al. 2013, 2016); that proof, in turn, crucially
exploits the subformula property of β-normal lambda terms.
Example 11. We illustrate this fundamental theorem with an example of an expansion on
Church numerals that has been studied in two of our important references (Takahashi
et al. 1996, Examples 2.11 and 3.6) (Broda and Damas 2005, Example 4.6). Pick diﬀerent
atoms p, q, set A0 := p ⊃ q, A1 := A0 ⊃ A0 and A2 := A1 ⊃ A1. Thus, A2 is obtained from
CHURCH by replacing p by A0. We calculate
F(⇒ A2) = λxA1λyA0λzp.gfpXσ1 . x〈F(∆1 ⇒ A0;Xσ1 ),F(∆1 ⇒ p;Xσ1 )〉 +
y〈F(∆1 ⇒ p;Xσ1 )〉
with ∆1 := x : A1, y : A0, z : p and σ1 := ∆1 ⇒ q.
F(∆1 ⇒ A0;Xσ1 ) = λwp.F(∆2 ⇒ q;Xσ1 ) with ∆2 := ∆1, w : p. Notice ∆1 6 ∆2.
F(∆2 ⇒ q;Xσ1 ) = Xσ2 with σ2 := ∆2 ⇒ q
F(∆1 ⇒ p;Xσ1 ) = gfpY σ
′
1 .z with σ′1 := ∆1 ⇒ p
We tacitly simplify gfpY σ
′
1 .z to z. Hence,
F(⇒ A2) = λxA1λyA0λzp.gfpXσ1 .x〈λwp.Xσ2 , z〉+ y〈z〉.
By the equivalence theorem, S(⇒ A2) = [[F(⇒ A2)]] = λxA1λyA0λzp.N with N the solution
of N = x〈λwp.[σ2/σ1]N, z〉+ y〈z〉. This should be compared with the production rules for
the standard inhabitants in Broda and Damas (2005, p. 377), which are followed by an
expansion to all η-long β-normal inhabitants. The result of Takahashi et al. (1996, Example
2.11) is an inﬁnite grammar whose description relies on ellipsis, and mathematical intuition
is needed to obtain a compact description. To the contrary, the result of Takahashi et al.
(1996, Example 3.6) is ﬁnite but is based on the total discharge convention which restricts
simply typed λ-calculus to a single variable per type (see also the discussion in the ﬁnal
section).
— F(⇒ INFTY) = λfp⊃p.gfp Xf:p⊃p⇒p.f〈Xf:p⊃p⇒p〉,
— F(⇒ CHURCH) = λfp⊃p.λxp.gfp Xσ .(f〈Xσ〉 + x) with σ := (f : p ⊃ p, x : p ⇒ p).
3. The inhabitation problems
We will study two decision problems in simply typed λ-calculus: the inhabitation problem
(=type emptiness problem) and the type ﬁniteness problem. First, we lay down the common
approach we will adopt to solve both problems. Next, we introduce a simpliﬁcation of
the semantics for λgfpΣ that we will employ in our proofs. After these two preliminary
subsections, we study the inhabitation and the ﬁniteness problems in this order, since
the solution of the former is used in the solution of the latter. In each case, an analysis
of the obtained algorithm is oﬀered, through a comparison with classical algorithms for
emptiness and ﬁniteness for context-free languages (recall the inhabitation and the type
ﬁniteness problems have been reduced to these problems in language theory (Takahashi
et al. 1996)).
3.1. The common approach
Given a sequent σ = (Γ⇒ A), we will write I(σ) for the set of inhabitants of A relative to
context Γ in λ, i.e., for the set {t ∈ λ | Γ ⊢ t : A in λ}. Recall that this describes the set of
η-long β-normal terms of ordinary simply typed λ-calculus receiving type A in context Γ.
For T ∈ λcoΣ , we call finite extension of T , which we denote by Eﬁn(T ), the set of the
ﬁnite members of T , i.e., Eﬁn(T ) = {t ∈ λ | mem(t, T )}.
Lemma 12 (Finite extension of forests).
— Eﬁn(λx
A.N) = {λxA.t | t ∈ Eﬁn(N)},
— Eﬁn(
∑
i Ei) =
⋃
i Eﬁn(Ei),
— Eﬁn(x〈Ni〉i) = {x〈ti〉i | ∀i, ti ∈ Eﬁn(Ni)}.
Proof. Obvious. Notice that, because of the coinductive nature of forests, these equations
do not constitute a structurally recursive deﬁnition of the ﬁnite extension. 
We will be mainly interested in the following predicates on forests concerning the ﬁnite
extension:
— exfinext(T ) :⇔ Eﬁn(T ) is non-empty. nofinext(T ) :⇔ Eﬁn(T ) is empty.
— finfinext(T ) :⇔ Eﬁn(T ) is ﬁnite. inffinext(T ) :⇔ Eﬁn(T ) is inﬁnite.
The predicates exfinext and finfinext will be characterized inductively in Sections 3.3 and
3.4, respectively, together with coinductive characterizations of nofinext and inffinext by
the generic De Morgan’s law relating least and greatest ﬁxed points.
Observe that, due to Proposition 1.3 and Theorem 10,
I(σ) = Eﬁn(S(σ)) = Eﬁn([[F(σ)]]). (1)
The inhabitation problem in simply typed λ-calculus is the problem ‘given sequent σ, is
the set I(σ) nonempty?,’ called INHAB in this paper. Its negation is called the ‘emptiness
problem’ (as is well-known, the answer to this question does not depend on whether all
λ-terms are considered or only the β-normal ones or even the η-long β-normal terms).
Decidability of the inhabitation problem in simply typed λ-calculus is a well-known result.
The ﬁrst instance of interest of the Equation (1) is worth a lemma.
Lemma 13 (Characterization of existence of inhabitants in λ). The set of inhabitants I(σ)
is non-empty iﬀ exfinext([[F(σ)]]).
As seen above, the function F is eﬀectively computable, and it yields closed well-bound
terms among the ﬁnitary forests. The missing link to deciding INHAB is thus the decision
of the problem ‘given a closed well-bound term T , does exfinext([[T ]]) hold?.’ Of course,
one cannot deal with closed ﬁnitary forests T in isolation and needs to address ﬁxpoint
variables properly. Neither the interpretation function [[·]] nor the predicate exfinext are
eﬀective, but we will deﬁne in Section 3.3 a syntax-directed predicate EF (more precisely, it
will be a predicate EFP parameterized over a decidable predicate P ) on ﬁnitary forests that
is equivalent to the composition exfinext ◦ [[·]], for at least those closed well-bound terms
that arise as F(σ) for some sequent σ (technically, the restriction will be to proper terms,
as deﬁned in Section 3.2). Syntax-directedness immediately entails that the predicate is
decidable.
The appeal of our approach is that, once the ﬁnitary representation of the corresponding
sequent has been built as F(σ), the decision of inhabitation is achieved through a simple
recursive function over the structure of λgfpΣ -terms, corresponding to an inductive predicate
adequately characterizing non-emptiness of types.
Using the same methodology, we can also reprove a more diﬃcult and not so well-
known result of inhabitation for simply typed λ-calculus, namely, that the problem ‘given
sequent σ, is the set I(σ) ﬁnite?’ is decidable. This problem – henceforth called FINHAB –
depends on studying only β-normal terms; to recall, the inhabitants of our system λ are
η-long β-normal simply typed λ-terms, for which the problem is studied in the literature
Hindley (1997) (there, in particular, the algorithm by Ben-Yelles Ben-Yelles (1979)). The
second instance of Equation (1) is again worth a lemma.
Lemma 14 (Characterization of type finiteness in λ). The set of inhabitants I(σ) is ﬁnite
iﬀ finfinext([[F(σ)]]).
Analogously to the emptiness problem, our method for establishing decidability of
FINHAB is to deﬁne a recursive predicate on ﬁnitary forests that is equivalent to the
composition finfinext ◦ [[·]], for at least those closed well-bound terms that arise as F(σ)
for some sequent σ (with the same technical condition as for the emptiness problem).
This will be the predicate FF (again, rather a parameterized predicate FFP ), studied in
Section 3.4.
3.2. A simplified semantics
We introduce a simpliﬁed interpretation of expressions of λgfpΣ in terms of the coinductive
syntax of λcoΣ . We adopt a simple and even possibly ‘wrong’ interpretation, which, however,
for λgfpΣ -terms representing solution spaces will be seen to be equivalent. Notably, the
simpliﬁed semantics dispenses with environments:
Definition 15 (Simplified interpretation of finitary forests as forests). For an expression T
of λgfpΣ , the simpliﬁed interpretation [[T ]]
s is a forest given by structural recursion on T :
[[Xσ]]s = S(σ) [[λxA.N]]s = λxA.[[N]]s
[[gfp Xσ .
∑
i
Ei]]
s =
∑
i
[[Ei]]
s [[x〈Ni〉i]]s = x〈[[Ni]]s〉i
Note that the base case proﬁts from the sequent annotation at ﬁxpoint variables, and the
interpretation of the gfp -constructor has nothing to do with a greatest ﬁxed point. Of
course, this may be ‘wrong’ according to our understanding of a greatest ﬁxed point.
Below, we will be specially interested in the ﬁnitary forests which guarantee that a
gfpXσ construction represents the solution space of σ.
Definition 16 (Proper expressions). An expression T ∈ λgfpΣ is proper if for any of its
subterms T ′ of the form gfp Xσ .
∑
i
Ei, it holds that [[T
′]]s = S(σ).
This means that an expression T is considered proper if, despite having used the
simpliﬁed deﬁnition of semantics for the embedded ﬁxed points, those subterms have
the ‘proper’ semantics, and this is only expressed with respect to our main question
of representing solution spaces, hence where for the ﬁxed-point variables, the reference
semantics of solution spaces is assumed.
For proper expressions, the simpliﬁed semantics agrees with the semantics we studied
before. Of course, this can only make sense for expressions which have that previous
semantics, in other words for well-bound and regular expressions.
Lemma 17. Let T be well-bound and ξ be an admissible environment for T such that
for all Xσ ∈ dom(ξ): ξ(Xσ) = S(σ). If T is proper, then [[T ]]ξ = [[T ]]s.
We remark that for any regular T , there is exactly one such minimal environment ξ, based
on comparing environments with respect to deﬁnedness.
Proof. By induction on expressions T . The variable case needs Lemma 7, lambda-
abstraction and tuples are ﬁne by the induction hypothesis. For the gfp case, it has
to be shown that [[T ]]s fulﬁls the ﬁxed-point equation deﬁning [[T ]]ξ , which suﬃces by
uniqueness of the solution. The induction hypothesis can be applied to the elimination
alternatives since the extended environment in which they have to be interpreted is of the
required form, just by T being proper. 
Corollary 18. For well-bound, closed and proper T , [[T ]] = [[T ]]s.
The corollary is suﬃcient for our purposes since F(σ) is not only well-bound and closed,
but also proper, as will be stated now.
Theorem 19 (Equivalence for simplified semantics). Let σ be a sequent and Ξ as in
Deﬁnition 8 so that F(σ; Ξ) exists (in particular, this holds for empty Ξ).
1. F(σ; Ξ) is proper.
2. [[F(σ; Ξ)]]s = S(σ).
exfin(N)
exfin(λxA.N)
exfin(Ej)
exfin(
∑
i Ei)
∀i, exfin(Ni)
exfin(x〈Ni〉i)
nofin(N)
nofin(λxA.N)
∀i, nofin(Ei)
nofin(
∑
i Ei)
nofin(Nj)
nofin(x〈Ni〉i)
Fig. 5. exfin predicate and nofin predicate.
Proof. Both items together by structural induction on the term F(σ; Ξ). This all goes
by unfolding the deﬁnitions and use of the induction hypothesis (the main case in the
proof of 1 needs 2 for the subterms, so 1 cannot be proven separately before 2, and the
main case of 2 immediately follows from the main case of 1, so it is better to prove both
together, although 2 could be proven separately before 1). 
We remark that the proof is a simpliﬁcation of the proof for Theorem 10 given
previously (Espı´rito Santo et al. 2016). We also remark that the equivalence theorem for
simpliﬁed semantics does not provide a compact description of solution spaces: applying
it to the term for F(⇒ A2) found in Example 11 yields the much less telling
S(⇒ A2) = λx
A1λyA0λzp.x〈λwp.S(σ2), z〉+ y〈z〉
that references S(σ2) in the right-hand side.
3.3. Deciding type emptiness
We introduce predicate nofin(T ), for T an expression of λcoΣ (a forest), which holds iﬀ
nofinext(T ), i.e., if the ﬁnite extension of T is empty, but it is deﬁned coinductively
in Figure 5, together (but independently) with the inductive deﬁnition of the predicate
exfin(T ) that is supposed to mean the negation of nofin(T ), but which is expressed
positively as existence of a ﬁnite member (i.e., that the ﬁnite extension is non-empty –
that exfinext(T ) holds).
Lemma 20. Given a forest T , exfin(T ) iﬀ nofin(T ) does not hold.
Proof. This is plainly an instance of the generic result in the style of De Morgan’s
laws that presents inductive predicates as complements of coinductive predicates, by a
dualization operation on the underlying clauses. The principle is recalled with details now.
Assume a set U (the ‘universe’) and a function F : P(U) → P(U) that is monotone,
i.e., for M ⊆ N ⊆ U, one has F(M) ⊆ F(N). Then, by Tarski’s ﬁxed-point theorem,
there exist the least ﬁxed point µF and the greatest ﬁxed point νF of F , with respect
to set inclusion. Moreover, µF is the intersection of all pre-ﬁxed points M ⊆ U of F ,
i.e., with F(M) ⊆ M, and νF is the union of all post-ﬁxed points M ⊆ U of F , i.e.,
with M ⊆ F(M). This lattice-theoretic duality allows to relate both concepts through
complements, with M{ := U \ M. Given F as before, deﬁne a monotone function
F† : P(U)→ P(U) by setting F†(M) := (F(M{)){. Then,
µF = (ν(F†)){.
This formula (written in logical terms with negation in place of set complement) is often
used to define µF , e. g., in µ-calculus. For a proof, it suﬃces to consider the inclusion
from left to right (the other direction is obtained by duality, using (F†)† = F). Since the
left-hand side is included in every pre-ﬁxed point of F , it suﬃces to show that the right-
hand side is such a pre-ﬁxed point, i.e., F((ν(F†)){) ⊆ (ν(F†)){. We show the contrapositive
ν(F†) ⊆ F†(ν(F†)) (using F† as abbreviation): but ν(F†) is a post-ﬁxed point itself (it is
even a ﬁxed point). 
The following lemma shows that the predicate nofin corresponds to the intended
meaning in terms of the ﬁnite extension. Additionally, the lemma shows that the negation
of nofin holds exactly for the forests which have ﬁnite members.
Lemma 21 (Coinductive characterization). Given a forest T . Then, nofin(T ) iﬀ Eﬁn(T ) is
empty, i.e., nofin = nofinext as sets of forests.
Proof. We give a coinductive argument in both directions. First, for a coterm M, let
inf(M) be deﬁned coinductively, as belonging to the greatest predicate inf satisfying
inf(λxA.M)⇔ inf(M) and inf(x〈Mi〉i)⇔ ∃j, inf(Mj).
This is a characterization of inﬁnity: for a coterm M, M is a λ-term iﬀ inf(M) does
not hold. The direction from left to right is by induction on λ-terms, and for the other
direction, the contrapositive is proven by coinduction on inf . Now, the statement of the
lemma is equivalent to: nofin(T ) iﬀ inf(M) for all M s. t. mem(M,T ). The ‘only if’ is
equivalent to: if nofin(T ) and mem(M,T ), then inf(M). This is provable by coinduction
on inf , using the obvious mem(M,M) for M in λco. The ‘if ’ implication is suitable for
coinduction on nofin, and this works smoothly. 
Thus, we are authorized to work with nofin and exfin in place of their ‘extensional
variants’ nofinext and exfinext.
Next, we turn to ﬁnitary representation of solution spaces and consider the predicate
EF(T ), for T an expression in λgfpΣ , which should hold when there is a ﬁnite solution. It is
not obvious from the outset if free ﬁxpoint variables should be considered as contributing
to these ﬁnite solutions. If one already knows that exfin(S(σ)) holds, then it would be
reasonable to put Xσ into the predicate EF. However, since our aim is to decide exfin ◦ S
through decidability of EF, we cannot base rules for EF on a decision concerning exfin◦S.
Still, once we have a decision procedure for exfin ◦ S, we can proﬁt from a deﬁnition
of EF that is sharp in the sense of containing variables Xσ by deﬁnition if and only
if exfin(S(σ)). And this we will do in Section 3.4, building more complex predicates
from EF.
We therefore consider a parameterized notion EFP with P a predicate on sequents and
instantiate it twice
— with P := Ø, the empty predicate which is trivially decidable, and,
— once exfin ◦ S is given a decision procedure, with P := exfin ◦ S.
P (σ)
EFP (X
σ)
EFP (N)
EFP (λx
A.N)
EFP (Ej)
EFP (gfpX
σ .
∑
i Ei)
∀i, EFP (Ni)
EFP (x〈Ni〉i)
¬P (σ)
NEFP (X
σ)
NEFP (N)
NEFP (λx
A.N)
∀i, NEFP (Ei)
NEFP (gfpX
σ .
∑
i Ei)
NEFP (Nj)
NEFP (x〈Ni〉i)
Fig. 6. EFP and NEFP predicates, for P satisfying the proviso: P ⊆ exfin ◦ S and P
decidable.
The general proviso on P is decidability of P and that, for all sequents σ, P (σ) implies
exfin(S(σ)), i.e., P ⊆ exfin ◦ S, when the predicates are seen as sets of sequents. This
proviso is trivially satisﬁed in both instantiations.§
The deﬁnition of this (parameterized) predicate EFP is inductive and presented in the
ﬁrst line of Figure 6, although it is clear that it could equivalently be given by a deﬁnition
by recursion over the term structure. Therefore, the predicate EFP is decidable, and we
tacitly identify the inductive deﬁnition and the recursive procedure.
The negation of predicate EFP is denoted by NEFP . Its inductive characterization is
easy, as all the rules of EFP are ‘invertible,’ and is given in the second line of Figure 6.
Below, when EFP or NEFP is written, it is implicitly assumed that P satisﬁes the proviso
of Figure 6.
Lemma 22. For all T ∈ λgfpΣ , NEFP (T ) iﬀ EFP (T ) does not hold.
Proof. Routine induction on T . In terms of the equivalent recursive deﬁnitions of the
predicates, this would have been just an application of De Morgan’s laws. 
Lemma 23. Let P ∈ {exfin, nofin} and σ 6 σ′. For all forests T , P (T ) iﬀ P ([σ′/σ]T ).
Proposition 2 (Finitary characterization).
1. If EFP (T ), then exfin([[T ]]
s).
2. Let T ∈ λgfpΣ be well-bound and proper. If NEFP (T ) and for all X
σ ∈ FPV(T ),
exfin(S(σ)) implies P (σ), then nofin([[T ]]s).
Proof. Item 1: Proof by induction on the predicate EFP (or, equivalently, on T ). The base
case for ﬁxed-point variables needs the proviso on P , and all other cases are immediate
by the induction hypothesis. Item 2 is proved by induction on the predicate NEFP (or,
equivalently, on T ).
Case T = Xσ . Then, ¬P (σ), hence, since Xσ ∈ FPV(T ), by contraposition and
Lemma 20, we get nofin(S(σ)).
Case T = gfpXσ .
∑
i Ei. Let N := [[T ]]
s =
∑
i[[Ei]]
s. As T is proper, N = S(σ).
We hence have to show nofin(S(σ)), which we do by an embedded coinduction for the
coinductively deﬁned predicate nofin. We have NEFP (Ei) for all i and want to use the
§ In a previous version of this paper, P was accidentally set to the always true predicate, in order to solve a
problem of extensionality of a predicate that was used to deal with FINHAB. That was an error and led to
incorrect proofs. We found this out by ourselves, but we also received a counterexample from Micha!l Ziobro
in January 2017 which we gratefully acknowledge.
induction hypothesis, which would give us nofin([[Ei]]
s) and thus nofin(
∑
i[[Ei]]
s), which
was our goal. Fix an i. Of course, Ei is also well-bound and proper. We have to consider
all Y σ
′
∈ FPV(Ei). Either Y σ
′
∈ FPV(T ), and we are ﬁne by hypothesis, or Y = X and,
since T is well-bound, σ 6 σ′. We just show that exfin(S(σ′)) does not hold: from our
coinductive hypothesis nofin(S(σ)), we get through Lemmas 7 and 23 even nofin(S(σ′)),
and this is the negation of exfin(S(σ′)). This is a proper application of the coinductive
hypothesis since it enters a lemma on nofin that does not change needed observation
depths and then goes into an elimination alternative, where the occurrences of free
ﬁxpoint variables are at least ‘guarded’ by an ordinary variable of a tuple.
The other cases are simple applications of the induction hypothesis. 
Theorem 24 (Deciding the existence of inhabitants in λ).
1. For any T ∈ λgfpΣ well-bound, proper and closed, EFP (T ) iﬀ exfin([[T ]]
s).
2. EFØ(F(σ)) iﬀ exfin(S(σ)) iﬀ I(σ) is non-empty.
3. exfin(S(σ)) is decided by deciding EFØ(F(σ)); in other words, INHAB is decided by the
computable predicate EFØ ◦ F.
Proof. Item 1 follows from both the parts of Proposition 2, Lemmas 20 and 22, and
the fact that, trivially, the extra condition in Proposition 2.2 is satisﬁed for closed terms.
Item 2: The ﬁrst equivalence follows from item 1 since by construction F(σ) is closed and
well-bound, and additionally, by Theorem 19, F(σ) is proper and [[F(σ)]]s = S(σ). For
the equivalence between exfin(S(σ)) and non-emptiness of I(σ), ﬁrst observe that non-
emptiness of I(σ) is equivalent to exfin([[F(σ)]]) by Lemma 13, the deﬁnition of exfinext,
and Lemmas 20 and 21; then, observe that exfin(S(σ)) is the same as exfin([[F(σ)]]), by
the already shown [[F(σ)]]s = S(σ) and Corollary 18.
Item 3: Use item 2, computability of F and the equivalence of the inductively deﬁned
EFØ with a recursive procedure over the term structure of its argument. 
Example 25. As expected, for our running examples,
— NEFØ(F(⇒ INFTY)) holds, because NEFØ(Xf:p⊃p⇒p); hence, INFTY is empty;
— EFØ(F(⇒ CHURCH)) holds, because EFØ(gfp Xσ .f〈Xσ〉+ x), due to the second alter-
native x; hence, CHURCH is non-empty.
If we disregard for a moment the ability of the present development to deal with the
decontraction phenomenon, we can see a close resemblance with the emptiness checking
for context-free grammars suggested by Hopcroft and Ullman (1979, Theorem 6.6). In
fact, they refer to an algorithm in the proof of their Lemma 4.1 (p. 89) that we will recall
in our own words. The set R of relevant non-terminals is computed. First, one puts all
the non-terminals in R that have a production with only terminals on the right-hand side.
Then, iteratively, all the non-terminals that have a production whose non-terminals in the
right-hand side are all in R are added to R. After the process comes to a halt, check if
the start symbol is in R.
Now to the algorithm provided by Theorem 24, in particular, the eﬀect of deciding
EFØ, given that the solution space is already presented in form of F(σ): EFØ does not
have a case for ﬁxed-point variables, it goes under the terminal symbol ‘λxA.,’ it branches
disjunctively over the elimination alternatives (corresponding to multiple productions),
and it branches conjunctively over the list of arguments after having gone under the
head variable (considered as terminal symbol). This is all what obviously has to be done,
while going under a gfp-operator does not make a ﬁxpoint variable more productive for
the emptiness question. The latter observation corresponds to the Hopcroft and Ullman
process of generating R that obviously does not get any help from recursive production
rules: only if all the non-terminals in the right-hand side were in R, the left-hand side
could be added to R.
The present proof is longer than the argument by Hopcroft and Ullman. This is
because the speciﬁcation and the algorithm are separated very carefully, invariants are
embodied in separate deﬁnitions and also their negations are made explicit. And, more
importantly, the chosen methodology is preparing the ground for the more challenging
decision of ﬁniteness. Finally, the decontraction phenomenon is being captured and does
not dominate the course of the arguments.
After having decided inhabitation, we can instantiate the predicate P anew, serving as
preparation for the decision of the question if there are ﬁnitely many inhabitants.
Definition 26. Let the decidable predicates EF⋆ and NEF⋆ on λ
gfp
Σ be deﬁned by EF⋆ := EFP
and NEF⋆ := NEFP for P := EFØ ◦ F, which satisﬁes the proviso by Theorem 24.2.
Proposition 2.2 and Theorem 24.2 give that NEF⋆(T ) implies nofin([[T ]]
s) for all well-
bound and proper expressions T . However, an inspection of the proof of that proposition
even shows that, for this particular case of NEFP , the latter two properties of T are not
needed:
Lemma 27 (Sharp finitary characterization). For all T ∈ λgfpΣ , EF⋆(T ) iﬀ exfin([[T ]]
s).
Proof. By the previous proposition, we only need to consider the direction from right
to left, and we prove its contraposition NEF⋆(T ) implies nofin([[T ]]
s) by induction on the
predicate NEF⋆.
Case T = Xσ . Then, ¬exfin(S(σ)) by hypothesis of this case and Theorem 24.2, and
this is nofin([[Xσ]]s).
Case T = gfpXσ .
∑
i Ei. Then, [[T ]]
s =
∑
i[[Ei]]
s. We have NEF(Ei) for all i and we use
the induction hypothesis, which gives us nofin([[Ei]]
s) for all i and thus nofin(
∑
i[[Ei]]
s),
which was our goal. Notice that this reasoning does not need further properties of T .
The other cases are likewise simple applications of the induction hypothesis. 
In particular, exfin([[T ]]s) is decidable, by deciding EF⋆(T ).
3.4. Deciding type finiteness
The development of this section will mostly mirror that of the preceding one. However, it
builds on its results already in the deﬁnitions.
We characterize the predicate finfinext by an inductively deﬁned predicate finfin.
Generically, we obtain a characterization of its negation inffinext by the coinductively
deﬁned dual inffin of finfin. The inductive deﬁnition of finfin is given in the ﬁrst line
nofin(N)
finfin(λxA.N)
finfin(N)
finfin(λxA.N)
∀i, finfin(Ei)
finfin(
∑
i Ei)
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finfin(x〈Ni〉i)
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Fig. 7. finfin predicate and inffin predicate.
of Figure 7. Notice that, while finfin is inductively deﬁned and has only ﬁnitely many
premises in each clause, there is absolutely no claim on decidability since the coinductively
deﬁned predicate nofin enters the premises.
By inversion (decomposing the summands into tuples) on nofin, one can show that
nofin ⊆ finfin (which corresponds semantically to the trivial nofinext ⊆ finfinext). Thus,
in particular, no clause pertaining to nofin is necessary for the deﬁnition of finfin(
∑
i Ei).
The predicate finfin is sound and complete in terms of membership:
Lemma 28 (Coinductive characterization). Given a forest T . Then, finfin(T ) iﬀ Eﬁn(T ) is
ﬁnite, i.e., finfin = finfinext as sets of forests.
Proof. The direction from left to right (soundness) is immediate by induction on finfin,
using Lemma 21. From right to left, we do induction on the sum of the term heights of all
ﬁnite members, which is a ﬁnite measure. The ﬁrst and fourth rule of finfin are necessary
to capture the cases when one passes from λ-abstractions to their bodies resp. from tuples
to their components – thus when the individual heights decrease – but when there is just
no element whose height decreases. The case of sums of elimination alternatives needs a
further decomposition into tuples, in order to be able to apply the inductive hypothesis.

Combined with Lemma 21, this gives an alternative proof of nofin ⊆ finfin.
The announced coinductive deﬁnition inffin that is meant to characterize inffinext is
found in the second line of Figure 7.
Lemma 29. Given a forest T , finfin(T ) iﬀ inffin(T ) does not hold.
Proof. inffin is deﬁned from finfin by the De Morgan’s law (as recalled in the proof of
Lemma 20). In the ﬁrst clause for inffin, the proviso exfin(N) is necessary for soundness,
and as well the proviso exfin(Nj) (with i = j) in the last clause. Only through these guards,
we can ensure that inffin ⊆ exfin, which is a minimum requirement given what they say
in terms of ﬁnite membership. Otherwise, the ﬁrst clause would allow to derive inffin(N)
for the inﬁnite λ-abstraction, satisfying the equation N = λxA.N for any choice of A and
without any relevance of the variable x. Similarly, for the third clause with the coterm N
satisfying N = x〈N〉. 
As a corollary, we obtain inffin = inffinext as sets of forests.
Now we introduce two predicates on expressions of λgfpΣ which will allow to characterize
type ﬁniteness, with the following intuitive meanings:
P (σ)
FFP (X
σ)
FFP (N)
FFP (λx
A.N)
∀i, FFP (Ei)
FFP (gfpX
σ .
∑
i Ei)
∀i, FFP (Ni)
FFP (x〈Ni〉i)
NEF⋆(Nj)
FFP (x〈Ni〉i)
¬P (σ)
NFFP (X
σ)
NFFP (N)
NFFP (λx
A.N)
NFFP (Ej)
NFFP (gfpX
σ .
∑
i Ei)
NFFP (Nj) ∀i, EF⋆(Ni)
NFFP (x〈Ni〉i)
Fig. 8. FFP and NFFP predicates, for P satisfying the proviso: P ⊆ finfin ◦ S and P
decidable.
1. FFP (T ): there are only ﬁnitely many ﬁnite members of T (the case of no ﬁnite members
is included in this formulation).
2. NFFP (T ): there are inﬁnitely many ﬁnite members of T .
Here, the predicate P on sequents controls the case of ﬁxpoint variables, as before for EFP
and NEFP . The general proviso on P is that it is decidable and that for all sequents σ, P (σ)
implies finfin(S(σ)), i. e., P ⊆ finfin ◦ S. For our main result, it will be suﬃcient to take
P := Ø. Another possibility – used in Section 4.3 – is choosing P := NEFØ ◦ F, i. e., with
the negation of the predicate underlying the deﬁnition of EF⋆ and NEF⋆. The deﬁnitions
of these predicates are inductive, and they are presented in Figure 8. Analogously to
the predicates EFP and NEFP , they could equivalently be deﬁned recursively over the
term structure, thus ensuring their decidability, thanks to the decision procedure for EF⋆.
Again, we do not formally distinguish between the inductive deﬁnition and the equivalent
recursive procedure.
Lemma 30. Let P := NEFØ ◦ F. Then, P qualiﬁes as parameter for the just introduced
predicates, and NFFP ⊆ EF⋆ or, equivalently, NEF⋆ ⊆ FFP . This would allow to remove the
condition EF⋆(Nj) from the tuple rule for NFFP .
Proof. We use that nofin ⊆ finfin and Theorem 24.2. The inclusion is veriﬁed by induction
on the deﬁnition of the predicate that is proven to be included. 
Below, when FFP or NFFP is written, it is implicitly assumed that P satisﬁes the proviso
of Figure 8.
Lemma 31. For all T ∈ λgfpΣ , NFFP (T ) iﬀ FFP (T ) does not hold.
Proof. Routine induction on T , using Lemma 22. 
Lemma 32. Let P ∈ {finfin, inffin} and Γ 6 Γ′. For all forests T , P (T ) iﬀ P ([Γ′/Γ]T ).
Proposition 3 (Finitary characterization).
1. If FFP (T ), then finfin([[T ]]
s).
2. Let T ∈ λgfpΣ be well-bound and proper. If NFFP (T ) and for all X
σ ∈ FPV(T ),
finfin(S(σ)) implies P (σ), then inffin([[T ]]s).
Proof. Structurally similar to the proof of Proposition 2.
1. By induction on FFP (or equivalently by structural induction on T ). We only show
the tuple cases with T = x〈Ni〉i. The other cases are equally simple.
Case for some j, NEF⋆(Nj). By Lemma 27, nofin([[Nj]]
s), hence finfin(x〈[[Ni]]s〉i), which
is finfin([[T ]]s).
Case for all i, FFP (Ni). By induction hypothesis, finfin([[Ni]]
s) for all i, hence
finfin([[x〈Ni〉i]]s).
2. By induction on FFP (or equivalently by structural induction on T ).
Case T = Xσ . Then, ¬P (σ), hence, since Xσ ∈ FPV(T ), by contraposition and
Lemma 29, we get inffin(S(σ)).
Case T = x〈Ni〉i. For some j, NFFP (Nj) and, for all i, EF⋆(Ni). The induction hypothesis
is applicable for Nj since FPV(Nj) ⊆ FPV(T ). Therefore, we have inffin([[Nj]]s). By
Lemma 27, exfin([[Ni]]
s), for all i, hence, we are done by deﬁnition of inffin.
Case T = gfpXσ .
∑
i Ei. For some j, NFFP (Ej). Let N := [[T ]]
s =
∑
i[[Ei]]
s. As T is
proper, N = S(σ). We hence have to show inffin(S(σ)), which we do by an embedded
coinduction for the coinductively deﬁned predicate inffin. We want to use the induction
hypothesis for Ej , which would give us inffin([[Ej]]
s) and thus inffin(
∑
i[[Ei]]
s), which
was our goal. Of course, Ej is also well-bound and proper. We have to consider all
Y σ
′
∈ FPV(Ej). Either Y σ
′
∈ FPV(T ), and we are ﬁne by hypothesis, or Y = X and,
since T is well-bound, σ 6 σ′. We just show that finfin(S(σ′)) does not hold: from our
coinductive hypothesis inffin(S(σ)), we get through Lemmas 7 and 32 even inffin(S(σ′)),
and this is the negation of finfin(S(σ′)). This is a proper application of the coinductive
hypothesis since it enters a lemma on inffin that does not change needed observation
depths and then goes into an elimination alternative, where the occurrences of free
ﬁxpoint variables are at least ‘guarded’ by an ordinary variable of a tuple.
The case of λ-abstractions is a simple application of the induction hypothesis. 
We remark that the proposition and its proof are rather analogous to Proposition 2 than
dual to it, although the logical structure of the predicates is rather dual: to enter a ﬁxed
point into FFP , all of the elimination alternatives have to be there already, while for EFP ,
only one of the elimination alternatives is required. However, this duality is broken for
the tuples: while for EFP , all arguments are required to be in the same predicate, FFP has
a rule that asks only about one argument, but for a diﬀerent predicate, and there is even
a second possibility. Anyway, the proof structure needs to be analogous since exfin and
finfin are both inductively deﬁned and therefore do not admit reasoning by coinduction.
Now the problem FINHAB can be solved in the same way as INHAB.
Theorem 33 (Deciding type finiteness in λ).
1. For any T ∈ λgfpΣ well-bound, proper and closed, FFP (T ) iﬀ finfin([[T ]]
s).
2. FFØ(F(σ)) iﬀ finfin(S(σ)) iﬀ I(σ) is ﬁnite.
3. finfin(S(σ)) is decided by deciding FFØ(F(σ)); in other words, FINHAB is decided by
the computable predicate FFØ ◦ F.
Proof. Follows the structure of the proof of Theorem 24.
1. Follows from both parts of Proposition 3, Lemmas 29 and 31, and the fact that,
trivially, the extra condition in Proposition 3.2 is satisﬁed for closed terms.
2. For the ﬁrst equivalence, apply 1. with both parts of Theorem 19. For the equivalence
between FFØ(F(σ)) and ﬁniteness of I(σ), apply 1. with Corollary 18 and Lemmas 28 and
14.
3. Use 2, computability of F and the equivalence of the inductively deﬁned FFØ with a
recursive procedure over the term structure of its argument, where, corresponding to the
last rule of Figure 8, the decisions for predicate NEF⋆ are invoked. 
Example 34. For our running examples, we have
— FFØ(F(INFTY)) holds, because FFØ(f〈Xf:p⊃p⇒p〉), due to NEF⋆(Xf:p⊃p⇒p) (note that the
fact NEFØ(F(f : p ⊃ p ⇒ p)) can be seen from the steps behind Example 25); hence,
INFTY is ﬁnite;
— NFFØ(F(CHURCH)) holds, because NFFØ(f〈Xσ〉) holds, for which we need both NFFØ(Xσ)
and EF⋆(X
σ) (again EFØ(F(σ)) can be seen from the steps behind Example 25; recall
σ := f : p ⊃ p, x : p⇒ p); hence, CHURCH is inﬁnite.
If, as for emptiness checking, we disregard the ability of the described method to
deal with decontraction, we can see similarities with ﬁniteness checking for context-free
grammars (Hopcroft and Ullman 1979, Theorem 6.6). Additionally, Hopcroft and Ullman
mention that decisions based on the pumping lemma are ‘highly ineﬃcient,’ but those
were alluded to in the approach by Takahashi et al. to inhabitation based on grammars
(Takahashi et al. 1996, Corollary 3.8). The algorithm described by Hopcroft and Ullman
does not work on a given context-free grammar but on an equivalent one that is in
Chomsky normal form and has no useless symbols (Hopcroft and Ullman 1979, p.88);
since there is no empty word in λ-calculus, we slightly simpliﬁed the presentation. In
the Chomsky normal form, without useless symbols, eﬀective dependency of a non-
terminal is identiﬁed by looking at the non-terminals that appear in the right-hand side
of its productions. Those dependencies constitute a directed graph, and ﬁniteness of the
grammar is equivalent to the absence of cycles in the dependency graph, thanks to the
absence of useless symbols.
The algorithm of Theorem 33 executes FFØ on F(σ). Basically, the algorithm for
conﬁrming ﬁniteness follows the term structure and has to avoid ‘hitting’ a ﬁxed-
point variable (since P = Ø). So even the sums of elimination alternatives are treated
conjunctively, as are the arguments in a tuple in the fourth rule of Figure 8. This is
all naturally mapped to the Hopcroft and Ullman description. However, the ‘grammar’
has not been shrunk to one without useless symbols, since the algorithm works on the
original data structure obtained in form of the ﬁnitary representation of the solution
space. Hitting on a ﬁxed-point variable does not mean the existence of inﬁnitely many
inhabitants if it corresponds to a useless symbol, and this is taken care of by the ﬁfth
rule of Figure 8 that allows any Ni, i 6= j if only Nj cannot contribute any inhabitant.
The latter is the high-level description; the decision algorithm runs a modiﬁcation of the
algorithm for deciding emptiness, with a non-trivial choice of the parameter P of NEFP , so
that ﬁxed-point variables of the whole ﬁnitary forest are handled according to the needs
of this subproblem (which, once again, is ruled out in Hopcroft and Ullman’s algorithm
by the assumption on useless symbols).
As for the treatment of INHAB, we claim separation of speciﬁcation and implementation,
explicit invariants, and no undue overhead for dealing with the fact that we are not faced
with context-free grammars but work with the original structure of λ-terms with possible
decontraction.
The analysis we did with EF⋆ and NEF⋆ can be replayed. In this paper, we do not exploit
that possibility. It is shown here for completeness.
Definition 35. Let the predicates FF⋆ and NFF⋆ on λ
gfp
Σ be deﬁned by FF⋆ := FFP and
NFF⋆ := NFFP for P := finfin ◦ S, which satisﬁes the proviso by Theorem 33.3. In
particular, FF⋆ and NFF⋆ are decidable.
Proposition 3.2 gives that NFF⋆(T ) implies inffin([[T ]]
s) for all well-bound and proper
expressions T . Again (as for Lemma 27), an inspection of the proof of that proposition
even shows that the latter two properties of T are not needed:
Lemma 36 (Sharp finitary characterization). For all T ∈ λgfpΣ , FF⋆(T ) iﬀ finfin([[T ]]
s).
In particular, finfin([[T ]]s) is decidable, by deciding FF⋆(T ).
4. On the number of inhabitants
The method of the preceding section is not conﬁned to the mere decision problems. In
particular, instead of only deciding FINHAB, the ﬁnitely many inhabitants can be eﬀectively
obtained. We will illustrate this for the somehow more basic question of determining their
number.
4.1. Head-variable controlled expressions
We have considered ﬁnitary forests throughout the paper modulo idempotence of the
summation operation (among other identiﬁcations). This is not an appropriate data
structure if ﬁnite members of its semantics are to be counted. A way out is to consider the
ﬁnite sums as functions from a ﬁnite set of (head) variables x into ﬁnite tuples 〈Nx,i〉i of
terms (among the ﬁnitary forests) headed by x. Then, the summand for x is x〈Nx,i〉i, and
the whole sum is over the ﬁnitely many chosen head variables. This disallows diﬀerent
summands with the same head variable, but we remark that F(σ) obeys to this restriction
that we call being head-variable controlled. Let those ﬁnitary expressions form the set HλgfpΣ
and call them head-variable controlled ﬁnitary forests. Analogously, form the set HλcoΣ of
head-variable controlled forests and remark that S(σ) falls into that restricted class.
Most readers might want to skip the following more detailed explanations and
immediately proceed to the next section (4.2).
In the following, we try to explain in more detail how to understand the head-variable
controlled elements: We have also considered forests throughout the paper modulo
idempotence of the summation operation (among other identiﬁcations). This does not
hinder us from counting the number of ﬁnite members in case it is ﬁnite. The ﬁnite
members themselves are ‘concrete,’ and the only identiﬁcation that is not expressed in the
grammar of λ is α-equivalence. However, we would prefer counting summandwise and
thus need to be sure that ﬁnite members do not belong to more than one summand in a
sum, and this by taking into account that occurrences are identiﬁed up to bisimulation.
Technically, this desideratum is achieved by considering a subset of forests that we call
head-variable controlled. The set HλcoΣ of head-variable controlled forests is obtained by
the same grammar of terms and elimination alternatives as λcoΣ , but with the restriction for
the formation of
∑
i Ei with Ei = xi〈N
i
j〉j that the xi are pairwise diﬀerent, i.e., no variable
is head of two summands in one sum, and this recursively throughout the forest. If we
consider this restriction in our view of sums as sets of elimination alternatives, this only
means that a given head variable cannot appear with two distinct tuples of arguments but
still can appear multiply. So, in order to proﬁt from the extra property of forests in HλcoΣ ,
we regard sums as functions from a ﬁnite set of (head) variables x into ﬁnite tuples of
forest headed by x and use the associated notion of bisimilarity (modulo α-equivalence).
This means, when we speak about head-variable controlled forests, we not only consider
forests satisfying this extra property, but also their presentation in this form that takes
proﬁt from it. This change of view does not change the notion of bisimilarity.
Analogously, we introduce the set HλgfpΣ of head-variable controlled elements of λ
gfp
Σ .
Again, this is not only a subset but comes with a diﬀerent presentation of sums as
functions from a ﬁnite set of (head) variables x into ﬁnite tuples of terms (among the
ﬁnitary forests) headed by x.
Notice that S(σ) and F(σ) always yield head-variable controlled terms, in the respective
term systems.
4.2. Counting inhabitants
We deﬁne the counting function # for head-variable controlled forests in finfin only, by
recursion on finfin. Notice that the well-deﬁnedness of the following function is addressed
in detail in Lemma 39 below.
Definition 37 (Infinitary counting function # : HλcoΣ ∩ finfin→ N).
#(λxA.N) :=
{
0 if nofin(N)
#(N) else
#(
∑
i Ei) :=
∑
i #(Ei)
#(x〈Ni〉i) :=
{
0 if ∃j, nofin(Nj)∏
i #(Ni) else
Note that, as usual, summing in the integers over no elements yields 0 and the corres-
ponding product is 1, hence #(x〈〉) = 1.
Lemma 38. Let T ∈ HλcoΣ . If nofin(T ) (in particular, finfin(T )), then #(T ) = 0.
Proof. Neither induction on T nor on nofin are available. The proof is by case analysis,
where one has to use that elimination alternatives are tuples. 
The following lemma can be considered a reﬁnement of the soundness part of Lemma 28.
Lemma 39. Let T be a head-variable controlled forest such that finfin(T ). Then, #(T ) is
a well-deﬁned natural number, and it is the cardinality of Eﬁn(T ).
Proof. Since sums are identiﬁed throughout the paper modulo idempotence, the rule for
sums would not make sense if T was not head-variable controlled. With this restriction,
function # becomes compatible with our identiﬁcations.
Intuitively, the recursive calls to # occur only with forests that enter finfin ‘earlier.’ We
are thus heading for a recursive deﬁnition of # that is over the inductive structure of the
supposed proofs of finfin(T ) for the allowed arguments T . Strictly speaking, predicate
finfin does not look suitable for such a recursive deﬁnition since its inductive deﬁnition is
not deterministic: there are two rules that allow to infer that lambda-abstractions enter
finfin, and their hypotheses can be simultaneously satisﬁed. The same holds of tuples. The
inductive deﬁnition can be turned into a deterministic one rather trivially: just restrict the
second and ﬁfth rule in Figure 7 to the cases where the ﬁrst and fourth rule do not apply,
i.e., thanks to Lemma 20, they become
exfin(N) finfin(N)
finfin(λxA.N)
∀i, exfin(Ni) ∀i, finfin(Ni)
finfin(x〈Ni〉i)
It is with respect to this restriction of allowed derivations that # becomes a plainly
structurally recursive function. The ‘oﬃcial’ deﬁnition of finfin is not given this way to
avoid clutter. Moreover, for the sake of well-deﬁnedness of #, it is not even necessary
to apply this modiﬁcation: the ‘else’ branches explicitly disallow that the ﬁrst and fourth
rule of Figure 7 have been applied in the last derivation step, so the recursive calls are
indeed with forests that come from the properly inductive clauses.
Being the correct number in the sense that #(T ) is the cardinality of Eﬁn(T ) is seen by
induction on finfin(T ), using Lemma 12 throughout. It also makes use of Lemma 21 for
the ‘if ’ cases of the deﬁnition, and the clause for sums of elimination alternatives is subject
to the presentation we convened for elements of HλcoΣ which ensures that the elements of
a disjoint union are counted. 
Remark: The proof of Lemma 38 only exploits the given deﬁning equations, hence does not
depend on the question of well-deﬁnedness of the previous lemma. It shows in particular
that #(λxA.N) = #(N) whenever N is in the domain of #. This does not entitle us to
remove the case distinction in the λ-abstraction case of the deﬁnition of #: the inﬁnite
λ-abstraction used in the proof of Lemma 29 would not be associated with a unique value
then (thus, # would no longer be well-deﬁned). For tuples, even claiming that, generally,
#(x〈Ni〉i) =
∏
i #(Ni) would require a very non-strict reading of the product that would
have to be deﬁned and be of value 0 as soon as one of the factors is 0.
While the inﬁnitary counting function will rather serve as a tool for veriﬁcation, we
now come to the deﬁnition of the counting function of interest for our applications.
Definition 40 (Finitary counting function # : HλgfpΣ → N). Deﬁne by recursion over the
term structure
#(Xσ) := 0
#(λxA.N) := #(N)
#(gfpXσ .
∑
i Ei) :=
∑
i #(Ei)
#(x〈Ni〉i) :=
∏
i #(Ni)
Lemma 41. Let T ∈ HλgfpΣ ∩ NEF⋆. Then, #(T ) = 0.
Proof. Induction over NEF⋆ (or, equivalently, over T ).
Case T = Xσ . Trivial.
Case T = λxA.N. Trivial by induction hypothesis.
Case T = x〈Ni〉i. By induction hypothesis, one of the factors is 0.
Case T = gfpXσ .
∑
i Ei. By induction hypothesis, all summands are 0. 
Proposition 4. Let P ⊆ nofin ◦ S and T ∈ HλgfpΣ ∩ FFP . Then, #(T ) = #([[T ]]
s).
Proof. We will write L and R for left-hand side and right-hand side of the equation
to prove. Since nofin ⊆ finfin, P qualiﬁes as parameter in FFP . By Proposition 3.1,
finfin([[T ]]s), hence R is well-deﬁned. The proof of L = R is by induction on T (or,
equivalently, by induction on FFP ).
Case T = Xσ . Then, nofin(S(σ)), hence #(S(σ)) = 0 by Lemma 38. Hence, R = 0 = L.
Case T = λxA.N. Then, FFP (N). L = #(N). R = #(λx
A.[[N]]s). According to the
deﬁnition of R, we have to distinguish if nofin([[N]]s) or not. In the ﬁrst case, by
Lemma 38, we have #([[N]]s) = 0. Thus, in both case, this gives R = #([[N]]s), while
L = #(N). Done by induction hypothesis.
Case T = x〈Ni〉i. Subcase NEF⋆(Nj) for some j. By Lemma 27, nofin([[Nj]]s). Hence,
R = 0. By Lemma 41, #(Nj) = 0, hence also L = 0 (since one factor is 0).
Subcase FFP (Ni) for all i. We may assume that we are not in the ﬁrst subcase that
has already been treated, hence EF⋆(Ni) for all i. By Lemma 27, ¬nofin([[Ni]]s) for all i.
Therefore, R =
∏
i #([[Ni]]
s), while L =
∏
i #(Ni). Done by induction hypothesis for all i.
Case T = gfpXσ .
∑
i Ei. Then, FFP (Ei) for all i. Just apply the induction hypothesis to
all the summands and sum up. (Notice how this case becomes the simplest one in our
setting with simpliﬁed semantics.) 
Theorem 42 (Counting theorem). Let P ⊆ nofin ◦ S (e. g., P = Ø). If FFP (F(σ)), then
#(F(σ)) is the cardinality of I(σ).
Proof. F(σ) ∈ HλgfpΣ . By the preceding proposition, using the assumption that FFP (F(σ)), we
obtain #(F(σ)) = #([[F(σ)]]s), which is #(S(σ)) by Theorem 19. Thanks to Proposition 3.1,
finfin(S(σ)), hence, by Lemma 39, #(S(σ)) is the cardinality of Eﬁn(S(σ)). 
Notice that when FFP (F(σ)) does not hold, then #(F(σ)) is meaningless, but NFFP (F(σ))
holds, and thus, inffin(S(σ)), which ensures that I(σ) is inﬁnite.
Remark on Theorem 42: Without any extra eﬀort, we can give an eﬀective deﬁnition
of the associated set of ﬁnite inhabitants through a function C : HλgfpΣ → Pfin(λ) by
C(Xσ) := Ø
C(λxA.N) := {λxA.t | t ∈ C(N)}
C(gfpXσ .
∑
i Ei) := ∪i C(Ei)
C(x〈Ni〉i) := {x〈ti〉i | ∀i, ti ∈ C(Ni)}
Then, for T ∈ HλgfpΣ , #(T ) is the cardinality of C(T ) (notice that the set union in the
gfp case is always a disjoint union), and if FFØ(F(σ)), then I(σ) = C(F(σ)). If not, I(σ) is
inﬁnite.
The counting functions may look simple, but they count ‘properly’ and are fully
integrated with our framework that establishes the decidability of the inhabitation
problems we addressed. By counting ‘properly,’ we understand that they identify α-
equivalent inhabitants (we do this implicitly in the whole paper), but do not apply the
‘total discharge convention’ that identiﬁes variables of the same type. For example, in
previous work on grammar presentations for β-normal λ-terms (Takahashi et al. 1996),
this convention is applied to obtain a ﬁnite context-free grammar. If the question is just
emptiness or ﬁniteness, the diﬀerence is of no importance, but already the question if
there is at most one inhabitant obviously depends on it. For example, the type p ⊃ p ⊃ p
has only one inhabitant with the total discharge convention while it has two in λ.
4.3. Predicting the number of inhabitants
The identiﬁcation of syntatic criteria on types telling about their number of inhabitants
has received a lot of attention for a long time, specially in the case of uniqueness of
inhabitants, due to its intimate relation to coherence theorems in category theory (Mints
1979). For example, consider the type A = (p+ ⊃ q+ ⊃ r−) ⊃ (p+ ⊃ q−) ⊃ p− ⊃ r+ of
the S-combinator, with atoms p, q and r, where we have marked positive and negative
occurrences by the superscripts + and − (positive and negative occurrences in a formula
are deﬁned as usual, with change of polarity when moving to the left argument of ⊃).
Now, only by observing that no atom occurs negatively more than once in A, it is possible
to tell immediately that A has at most one (βη-normal) inhabitant.
In this section, we show the tools we developed at work in this kind of questions, and
we give a new and perspicuous proof of an old theorem, in a rather recent more general
form.
We consider the coherence theorem for balanced types. Those are types where no atom
occurs positively more than once or negatively more than once. Put diﬀerently, any atom
in a balanced formula has at most two occurrences, and if there are two, they have
opposite polarities. Using proof-theoretic methods, Mints (1992) proved that balanced
types have at most one βη-normal inhabitant, extracting from this a coherence theorem
for cartesian closed categories. By a close inspection of Mints’ proof, Aoto and Ono (1994)
generalized the result to the so-called negatively non-duplicated types, i.e., types where no
atom occurs negatively more than once. (For example, uniqueness of inhabitation of
the type A of the S -combinator above does not follow from the coherence theorem for
balanced formulas – since A has two positive occurrences of atom p, but follows from
this generalization.) Bourreau and Salvati (2011) reproved this result through a game
semantics approach. Using the proof-tree method, Broda and Damas (2005) were able to
reprove the uniqueness result of Aoto and Ono, and extend it to the class of deterministic
types, a class deﬁned by means of the proof-tree generated by a type. In the same work,
Broda and Damas also established that positively non-duplicated types have ﬁnitely many
inhabitants.
We now show how to obtain the state-of-the-art results with our tools.
Definition 43. Let T ∈ λgfpΣ .
1. T is strongly acyclic if T has no occurrence, free or bound, of ﬁxed-point variables
(other than the binding occurrences after gfp).
2. T is deterministic if every sum in T has at most one summand.
Lemma 44. Let T ∈ λgfpΣ .
1. If T is strongly acyclic, then FFØ(T ).
2. If T is deterministic, then #(T ) 6 1 and, in addition, EFØ(T ) implies FFØ(T ).
Proof. In each case by a straightforward induction on T . 
Let A = ~A ⊃ p. We say p is the target atom of A. The occurrence of p that makes
p the target atom of A is called its tail occurrence in A. Let σ = (Γ ⇒ A), with
Γ = {x1 : C1, · · · , xn : Cn}. Put Aσ := ~C ⊃ ~A ⊃ p (the order of the Ci’s does not matter).
In particular, if σ is ⇒ A, then Aσ = A.
Lemma 45.
1. If no atom occurs positively more than once in A, then F(⇒ A) is strongly acyclic.
2. If no atom occurs negatively more than once in A and EFØ(F(⇒ A)), then F(⇒ A) is
deterministic.
Proof. Recall Deﬁnition 8 of F(σ; Ξ). Some extra, auxiliary deﬁnitions are needed. We
say an atom p is a target atom of Ξ if p = qi, for some (Xi : Θi ⇒ qi) ∈ Ξ. Let A\Ξ be
the formula resulting from A = ~A ⊃ p by erasing in ~A each Ai whose target atom is a
target atom in Ξ.
We generalize item 1 and prove: if F(σ; Ξ) is deﬁned and P (σ; Ξ), then F(σ; Ξ) is
strongly acyclic, with the predicate P (the invariant for the ‘positive’ case) deﬁned as
follows:
Predicate P (σ; Ξ) holds if, for every atom p, p does not occur positively in Aσ\Ξ
more than once; and if p does occur positively in Aσ\Ξ, then p is not a target atom
of Ξ.
Notice that, if σ = (⇒ A) and Ξ = ·, then P (σ; Ξ) iﬀ no atom occurs positively
more than once in A. Thus, the implication we are proving is a proper generalization of
item 1.
The proof is by induction on F(σ; Ξ). Suppose P (σ; Ξ). Let σ := Γ ⇒ ~A ⊃ p and
∆ := Γ ∪ {z1 : A1, · · · , zn : An} and σ′ := ∆⇒ p.
Since p occurs positively in Aσ\Ξ, p is not a target atom of Ξ, hence the if-guard in the
deﬁnition of F(σ; Ξ) does not hold. Then, F(σ; Ξ) is given by
λzA11 · · · z
An
n .gfp Y
σ′ .
∑
(y:~B⊃p)∈∆
y〈F(∆⇒ Bj; Ξ, Y : σ
′)〉j (∗)
In order to show that F(σ; Ξ) is strongly acyclic, it suﬃces to show that, for each y
in the sum and each j, F(σj; Ξ
′) is strongly acyclic, where we let σj := ∆ ⇒ Bj and
Ξ′ := Ξ, Y : σ′. We need some work before we embark on the proof.
Observe that Aσ = Aσ′ = ~C ⊃ ~A ⊃ p, for some ~C; moreover, Aσj = ~C ⊃ ~A ⊃ Bj , with
Bj a component of ~B; and ~B ⊃ p is a component of ~C or ~A that is erased in Aσj\Ξ
′ by
the extra target atom p of Ξ′.
Each atom occurrence in Aσj has a corresponding atom occurrence in Aσ . Due to the
duplication of Bj in Aσj , there may be two occurrences in Aσj that correspond to the
same occurrence in Aσ , and the tail occurrence of p in Aσ corresponds to no occurrence.
Now we need two observations: (i) the new copy of Bj preserves the polarities of atom
occurrences; (ii) the old copy of Bj is erased in Aσj\Ξ
′. Hence, when starting from atom
occurrences in Aσj\Ξ
′ only, there is a corresponding atom occurrence in Aσ\Ξ; moreover,
this restricted correspondence is injective and polarity preserving. So, using that p is not
a target atom of Ξ, we proved:
If an atom has two occurrences in Aσj\Ξ
′ with some polarity, so it does in Aσ\Ξ. (∗∗)
Fact (**), together with P (σ; Ξ), yields that no atom occurs positively more than once in
Aσj\Ξ
′.
Now we argue that, if an atom q has a positive occurrence in Aσj\Ξ
′, then it is not
a target atom of Ξ′. Suppose atom q has a positive occurrence in Aσj\Ξ
′. We want to
prove that q is neither p nor a target atom of Ξ. First, q cannot be p (otherwise p would
have two positive occurrences in Aσ\Ξ: the corresponding one and the tail occurrence).
Second, given that q has a positive occurrence in Aσ\Ξ, q is not a target atom of Ξ, due
to P (σ; Ξ).
So, we secured P (σj; Ξ
′). By induction hypothesis, F(σj; Ξ
′) is strongly acyclic.
Item 2. More auxiliary deﬁnitions are needed.
Predicate N(σ; Ξ) holds if, for every atom p, p does not occur negatively in Aσ\Ξ more
than once.
Notice that, if σ = (⇒ A) and Ξ = ·, then N(σ; Ξ) iﬀ no atom occurs negatively more
than once in A. Notice also that this predicate N is not the dual of predicate P , used for
item 1.
Predicate S (σ) holds if, given Aσ = ~C ⊃ p, for every atom q (including p): (i) q has at
most one negative occurrence (relatively to Aσ) in each Ci, and (ii) if ~D ⊃ q and ~D′ ⊃ q
are negative subformulas of Aσ with maximally extended argument vectors, then ~D = ~D′.
Predicate R(σ; Ξ) holds if (i) Ξ = (Ξ′, XΘ⇒p) implies that there is (y : ~B ⊃ p) ∈ Θ,
and Bj ∈ ~B s. t. σ = Θ ⇒ Bj; and (ii) Ξ = Ξ′, XΘ⇒p, Y Θ
′⇒q ,Ξ′′ implies that there is
(y : ~B ⊃ p) ∈ Θ, and Bj ∈ ~B s. t. Bj = ~D ⊃ q, and Θ′ = Θ ∪ {z1 : D1, · · · , zm : Dm}. ¶
The following two claims are easily proved by induction on F(σ; Ξ):
Claim 1. If S (σ) holds and F(σ′; Ξ′) is a recursive call in the computation of F(σ; Ξ) (for
any Ξ), then S (σ′) holds.
Claim 2. If R(σ; Ξ) holds and F(σ′; Ξ′) is a recursive call in the computation of F(σ; Ξ),
then R(σ′; Ξ′) holds.
The following is also needed:
Claim 3. If σ = Γ⇒ ~A ⊃ p, and Ξ = Ξ1, XΘ⇒p,Ξ2, and R(σ; Ξ) holds, then F(σ; Ξ) is not
strongly acyclic.
This claim is proved by induction on F(σ; Ξ).
If the if-guard of F(σ; Ξ) holds, F(σ; Ξ) has form λzA11 · · · z
An
n .Y
σ′ , which is not strongly
acyclic.
If not, let ∆ := Γ ∪ {z1 : A1, . . . , zn : An} and σ′ := ∆⇒ p. Then, F(σ; Ξ) is given by (*)
above.
As before, let Ξ′ := Ξ, Y : σ′ and, for a given choice of (y : ~B ⊃ p) ∈ ∆ and index j, let
σj := ∆⇒ Bj .
Subcase Ξ2 = Ø. Because R(σ; Ξ) (part (i)) holds, there is (y : ~B ⊃ p) ∈ Γ s. t. ~A ⊃ p = Bj
for some j. So, F(σj; Ξ
′) = λwA11 · · ·w
An
n .Y
∆′⇒p, for ∆′ := ∆ ∪ {w1 : A1, . . . , wn : An} (since
|∆| = |∆′|), hence this recursive call is not strongly acyclic, and so is F(σ; Ξ).
Subcase Ξ2 = Z
Θ′⇒q ,Ξ3. Because R(σ; Ξ) (part (ii)) holds, there is (y : ~B ⊃ p) ∈ Θ
s. t. Bj = ~D ⊃ q for some j. It is an easy observation that Θ ⊆ ∆ (even Θ ⊆ Γ), hence
there is a recursive call F(∆⇒ ~D ⊃ q; Ξ′), and thanks to Claim 2 and to the fact that q is
a target atom of Ξ′, the induction hypothesis guarantees that this recursive call produces
a not strongly acyclic term, and so F(σ; Ξ) is not strongly acyclic.
Another observation needed is:
Claim 4. If S (σ) and EFØ(F(σ; Ξ)), then F(σ; Ξ) is strongly acyclic.
Again, this claim is proved by induction on F(σ; Ξ). The if-guard of F(σ; Ξ) cannot
hold because of EFØ(F(σ; Ξ)). So F(σ; Ξ) is given by (∗). Because EFØ(F(σ; Ξ)), for some
(y : ~B ⊃ p) ∈ ∆, EFØ(y〈F(σj; Ξ′)〉j), hence for all j, we get EFØ(F(σj; Ξ′)), and because
of S (σ), and Claim 1, the induction hypothesis can be used to conclude F(σj; Ξ
′) is
strongly acyclic. Because of S (σ) all summands in (∗) are of the form y′〈F(σj; Ξ′)〉j (with
(y′ : ~B ⊃ p) ∈ ∆), hence all summands in (∗) are strongly acyclic, and so is F(σ; Ξ).
Now we prove:
Claim 5. If N(σ; Ξ), S (σ), R(σ; Ξ) and EFØ(F(σ; Ξ)), then F(σ; Ξ) is deterministic.
Again, this claim is proved by induction on F(σ; Ξ), and the if-guard of F(σ; Ξ) cannot
hold because of EFØ(F(σ; Ξ)). So, F(σ; Ξ) is given by (∗). From, EFØ(F(σ; Ξ)) there is
¶ R comes from recursive, and has to do with the observation that any recursive call resulting from F(σ; Ø)
satisﬁes R. This is not intrinsically related to the control of negative occurrences of atoms.
at least one summand. From the assumptions and Claims 3 and 4, it must be the case
that p is not a target atom of Ξ. For each recursive call F(σj; Ξ
′), using the assumptions,
Claims 1 and 2 and reasoning analogous to that used in the previous claim, we have
S (σj), R(σj; Ξ
′) and EFØ(F(σj; Ξ
′)), and from assumption N(σ; Ξ), we also get N(σj; Ξ
′)
from (**) above. Hence, by induction hypothesis, F(σj; Ξ
′) is deterministic. It remains to
argue that there is exactly one summand in (∗), but this is a consequence of N(σ; Ξ) and
p 6∈ Ξ, which guarantee that there is at most one (y : ~B ⊃ p) ∈ ∆.
Finally, the following claim suﬃces to conclude the proof of the lemma:
Claim 6. If no atom occurs negatively in σ more than once, and EFØ(F(σ; Ø)), then F(σ; Ø)
is deterministic.
This follows by taking Ξ = Ø in Claim 5, since N(σ; Ø) and S (σ) are both consequences
of σ having no atom occurring negatively more than once, and since R(σ; Ø) holds
vacuously. 
Theorem 46 (Generalized coherence).
1. If no atom occurs positively more than once in A, then A has only ﬁnitely many
inhabitants.
2. If no atom occurs negatively more than once in A, then A has at most one inhabitant.
Proof. Item 1: Suppose no atom occurs positively more than once in A. By Lemma 45,
F(⇒ A) is strongly acyclic. By Lemma 44, FFØ(F(⇒ A)). By Theorem 33.2, I(⇒ A) is
ﬁnite. Item 2: Suppose no atom occurs negatively more than once in A. If EFØ(F(⇒ A)),
then by Lemma 45, F(⇒ A) is deterministic. By Lemma 44, #(F(⇒ A)) 6 1, and also
FFØ(F(⇒ A)); hence, by Theorem 42, #(F(⇒ A)) is the cardinality of I(⇒ A) – and this
is 6 1. If EFØ(F(⇒ A)) does not hold, then by Theorem 24.2, I(⇒ A) is empty. 
We remark that the condition EFØ(F(⇒ A)) in Lemma 45.2 cannot be omitted: consider
the formula A := ((((r− ⊃ p+) ⊃ q−) ⊃ q+) ⊃ p−) ⊃ p+ with diﬀerent atoms p, q, r, where
the polarities are indicated as superscripts. It has only one negative occurrence of these
atoms, but F(⇒ A) is not deterministic. (Atom p has two positive occurrences in A, hence
the classical coherence theorem does not apply, but the generalized one that we reproved
here.)
Trivially, if the conditions on the occurrences in the theorem are not met, the conclusions
can become wrong: CHURCH = (p+ ⊃ p−) ⊃ p− ⊃ p+ has two positive occurrences of
p and inﬁnitely many inhabitants (by the second part of the theorem, the two negative
occurrences are needed for that as well), while p− ⊃ p− ⊃ p+ has two negative occurrences
of p and two inhabitants.
5. Final remarks
This paper develops a methodology to address inhabitation problems in the simply typed
λ-calculus based on the ﬁnitary representation of the search space oﬀered by the calculus
λ
gfp
Σ . With it, we could cover a representative range of decision and counting problems
and two recent generalizations of the coherence theorem, conﬁrming the scope of the
methodology. Moreover, we obtained new solutions and new proofs which shed new
light on the problems and theorems, as they also come with a structural analysis: there
are syntax-directed deﬁnitions of certain crucial predicates and functions, and the syntax
underneath is precisely λgfpΣ . In the background, there is the calculus λ
co
Σ , as the semantic
domain against which we assess the development in λgfpΣ . λ
co
Σ provides an extension of
the Curry–Howard paradigm of representation from proofs, to search runs, and to the
search space. Because of this paradigm, binding and α-equivalence are unproblematic, and
we did not have to concern with discharge conventions or resort to methods or binding
representations in other areas than λ-calculus and types.
Many approaches exist in the study of inhabitation problems in the simply typed
λ-calculus, some adapting tools from automata and language theory (Dowek and Jiang
2009; Schubert et al. 2015; Takahashi et al. 1996) or game theory (Bourreau and Salvati
2011), others creating new representations like in the formula-tree method (Alves and
Broda 2015; Broda and Damas 2005) and others through a direct combinatorial analysis
of a graph-theoretic representation of the search space (Wells and Yakobowski 2004).
All these approaches have their merits, and making connections to other ﬁelds is one of
them. But our structural approach also has noteworthy properties, like the elegance and
novelty of the solutions for a wide range of problems, never covered before by a single
approach, going from decision algorithms to coherence. In addition, given the paradigm
and standpoint of our approach, not only does it occupy a special place, but also it
enjoys certain advantages coming from the proximity to the λ-calculus, which are not to
be dismissed: one is the possibility of a mechanical formalization, the other is the already
referred absence of problems with binding, on which we want to insist.
In fact, we see in some of the alternative approaches mentioned above the struggle
with α-equivalence and discharge conventions, which is the price to pay for having to
account for binding with foreign tools. For instance, several times we see the need to
resort to the total discharge convention in order to obtain ﬁnite structures, like grammars
or graphs, and eﬀective procedures (Dowek and Jiang 2009; Takahashi et al. 1996; Wells
and Yakobowski 2004); and only in a second stage may one enumerate or count all the
proofs, after some expansion procedure to capture the inhabitants that do not obey the
convention. But we already see the indication that this second stage, in more complex
logics, requires hard work (Dowek and Jiang 2009). In our approach, instead, there is no
second stage, nor do we need to care about the discharge convention: F(σ) is immediately
and simultaneously the full space and data for algorithms.
The present paper covers simple types only, as most papers in the ﬁeld (notable excep-
tions are Dowek and Jiang (2009) and Wells and Yakobowski (2004)). Our methodology
for attacking decision problems related to inhabitation rests on the availability of a correct
and eﬀective representation of the search space in a ﬁnitary calculus like λgfpΣ . For the
logic studied here, such representation was obtained previously (Espı´rito Santo et al. 2013,
2016), and is a consequence of the subformula property, as a close inspection reveals. So
any other logic with this property is amenable to our methodology in principle, and we are
interested in investigating whether our methodology can obtain again ‘structural’ solutions
for decision problems in richer logics. For example, it would be interesting to know if,
in the presence of a connective like disjunction, our methodology produces a (simple)
decision function for the INHAB problem; or if we can even move to the λµ-calculus, as
was done by David and Zaionc (2009), or to the rich setting of intersection types, whose
general inhabitation problem is undecidable, but where recent developments (Bucciarelli
et al. 2014; Dudenhefner and Rehof 2017) identify decidable fragments.
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